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In early December, the U.S. President brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. His pledge was an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Weeks later, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, targeting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President declared, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Strategic Pivot

This dichotomy encapsulates the core principle of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a moving away from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on commerce and conflict resolution—though how this fits with the emerging air campaign in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a top U.S. state department official during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration spokesperson reinforced this, saying the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Mixed Signals

This shift is major, but observers note it is too soon to gauge its impact. The approach is complicated by the President’s direct manner, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a scholar for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study estimates this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

International Apathy and Tensions

Differing from his immediate predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous foray into African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later admitted using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major feud has developed with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Diplomacy and Targeted Intervention

A similar tension appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the stern rhetoric may have spurred the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

An Echo of Rivals

Observers characterize the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.